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ABSTRACT
The article presents an assessment of the capital market for
technology-based firms, focusing upon the links between the
stages of evolution of a firm and the investment preferences of
various capital sources. These factors lead to an expectation that
initial capital will be supplied most frequently by the
entrepreneurs themselves from their own savings, secondarily by
their families and friends and by private investors, all these
being sources of capital outside of the formal channels. More
substantial but still initial funding from "wealthy family funds",
special "seed" funds and somewhat more conventional venture
capital funds are expected to be the primary complements of the
informal sources.
Data from studies of new technological firms support these
expectations, providing evidence of the usual small initial capital
base (almost half with less than $10,000) and the dominance of
personal savings as the principal source of initial capital (74
percent of the companies). "Outside" sources of capital are
responsible for the larger initial investments when they occur.
Larger amounts of initial capital are both contributed and raised
by larger groups of co-founders, especially when the founders are
involved in the companies from the outset on a full-time basis.
Specific plans for the company are associated with greater
initial capitalization, as well as with raising outside capital, as
is also true for the effect of having an initial product. The needs
for initial capital vary enormously by amount and intended use as
a function of the type of business being started, with consulting
firms and software companies requiring far less than hardware
developers and producers.
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Entrepreneurial people provide the initiative, the energy and the vision
for launching a new company. Advanced technology often provides the unique
competitive advantage over existing companies or the basis for creating a
new market. But money provides "the grease", the wherewithal to make it
happen, even for the high technology firm.
In recent years numerous books and articles have been published on how
to manage venture capital investing along with even more publications on how
to raise capital for the new enterprise. The related research literature has
been growing at a rapid clip, as indicated by the fact that approximately
eleven percent of the papers presented at the annual Entrepreneurship
Research Conference since 1981 have focused on venture capital and an
additional six percent on other aspects of financing. (Hornaday & Churchill,
1987) A reasonable number of these papers have looked at technology-based
firms and several contain data regarding initial financing of these companies.
This article establishes a general background for understanding the financing
of a technological firm by first discussing the several stages of a company's
financial development and the variety of potential financial sources relevant
to the firm, utilizing the research literature to help provide this background.
This discussion leads to a set of expectations or hypotheses as to the initial
sources of capital for the technological enterprise. Empirical studies of more
than one hundred technological firms then provide the detailed data for
verifying these expectations, indicating the sources and extent of initial
capital base of the technical enterprise and the factors affecting this initial
financing.
STAGES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
The new technology-based firm evolves through a succession of several
stages of corporate growth and parallel development of its financial needs.
The period of time during which a company can be classified in a particular
phase varies widely among firms and the dividing line between phases is at
best fuzzy. Yet the relative stage of evolution does strongly influence the
type and amount both of capital required and especially of capital available.
Ruhnka & Young (1987) surveyed executives of 73 venture capital companies
and found that in general they perceived five different stages of new company
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4development, from seed to exit, each stage characterized by distinctive
features. Of most importance these potential investors estimated sharp
decline in their risk of loss of investment, depending upon the stage at which
they invested, from 66 percent at the seed stage down to 20 percent at the
exit stage. (p. 181) To understand this relationship more clearly I shall first
examine the general characteristics of the firm at each stage, which in turn
imply the nature of its likely financial backers. Empirical research will later
be used further to illuminate these financing relationships.
Traditionally the technical firm has been visualized as going through a
usually pre-company R&D stage, followed by three phases of corporate
development: (1) start-up, (2) initial growth, and (3) sustained growth. The
research and development phase often takes place in the laboratory of some
other "source" organization or the basement of a founder's home, often while
the founders are still employed "full time" for another organization. It
involves experimental verification of product principles and may include
attempts to determine commercial applicability. Few resources other than
the founders' time are generally employed at this "pre-venture stage". In
recent years the financial community has become more involved in this
pre-company stage, often with university laboratories or their direct
spinoffs, in the long-term funding of ambitious R&D programs with hoped-for
commercial outcomes. Sometimes the mechanism of an "R&D Limited
Partnership" is employed during this stage, especially in recent years with
biotechnology companies, but the R&D stage (especially R !) remains a largely
pre-corporate or at least unfunded aspect of most new companies' formation
and development. The R&D stage does sometimes overlap with the "zero
stage" of start-up firms, as will be discussed below.
Phase 1 -- Start-up
The start-up phase begins with the founding of the company and ends,
more-or-less, when the company has experienced significant sales (at least a
few hundred thousand dollars per year) and has developed one or more
products or services that exhibit growth potential. In recent years the
start-up phase has been subdivided conceptually into the "seed stage" or "zero
stage" and the "first stage". During the so-called "zero stage", the new
company works out its basic technology, formulates its initial strategy, and
rounds out the start-up team.
5At the outset of its "seed phase" the company often lacks an operating
prototype of its intended product and even has little in the way of a formal
business plan. Many companies carry what we described above as a
"pre-company R&D stage" into this "seed phase", continuing to solve key
product development issues and moving toward an operating demonstration
prototype of their initial product. Following the seeding activities is the
more conventional "first stage", during which the company generally has
produced a reasonably well-defined business plan, an emerging organizational
structure built up around several key committed personnel, and a product for
which at least some level of commercial applicability has been demonstrated.
During the entire start-up phase the new technological firm typically
devotes considerable time to product development. It is dealing with only a
few customers but is actively seeking new marketing/sales channels. The
firm is housed in modest facilities, using barely adequate equipment. It has
little or no available financial collateral. Typically few of the people in the
company have substantial management experience; a large portion of the
founders and their early employees are technical people by education and
work experience. The company is able to react quickly when opportunities
arise. However, the company is usually losing money.
The financial needs of the firm during the start-up phase are many. It
needs capital to finance product development, primarily to support salaries
for the technical personnel, despite the fact that many or all of them are
being paid lower salaries than in their previous jobs, earning by their
financial sacrifice the so-called "sweat equity" ownership in their company.
Some capital is also needed for equipment. Working capital may be required
if the company is already producing products for sale. Since the company is
losing money, the entrepreneur must turn outside the firm for capital.
But what type of investor would be willing to supply initial capital to
such a new company? Since the investment is so risky, the potential payoff
must be high in order to outweigh the high probability of failure. The capital
source must be patient, willing to wait for five to ten years for a return. He,
she or it must trust unproven management to develop, produce, and sell a
product or service that often does not yet exist. Such an investment is
viewed by many as analogous to putting several hundred thousand dollars or
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6more on the Daily Double!
Phase 2 -- Initial Growth
The initial growth phase can be felt to begin when the company has
completed the development of a product line and has sufficient sales to
justify an expectation of rapid growth. The phase may be regarded to end
when the company has lived up to such expectations and demonstrated a
capability to operate profitably and grow quickly. During this phase the
company matures somewhat. It begins to work on product quality and on
lowering unit costs. Although gaining new customers it is also beginning to
face some competition from other small firms and sometimes from large
corporations as well, giving the young company strong incentives to develop
new products. The company is operating profitably, but the resultant cash
flows are typically insufficient to supply the needed growth capital.
The problems which the firm faces are also changing. Plant and
equipment are needed. Working capital needs are expanding with the growth
in sales. Key management personnel are needed as production, sales and
marketing, and research and development become important functional areas.
Management and operations control become important to keep the company
operating efficiently.
The type of financial backers which the firm attracts tends to change
with the company's characteristics. The risk and uncertainty associated with
the company decrease. The young company still offers the opportunity for a
large payoff, but the probability of failure, though still large, has decreased
significantly. The investment need not be locked in for more than two to
three years, if the founders are willing and the financial market permits the
company to go public or to be sold to a larger firm during these next few
years. The company no longer needs a gambler to supply capital, but phase
two investors must still be speculators at least over the near term.
Phase 3 -- Sustained Growth
Having solved its initial start-up and early growth problems, the
successful company emerges as a growth business. It has annual sales in the
millions of dollars and employment numbers in the hundreds. The enterprise
7begins to face many of the problems of the large corporation but on a smaller
scale. The firm serves many customers with a variety of products and
services and is faced with strong competition. Profits and cash flows are
sufficient to meet the majority of its capital requirements, but new growth
possibilities are continually being presented. Indeed, growth rate of the
company may be the source of its most serious challenges, including financing
the growth.
The major problems facing the entrepreneur change significantly during
phase three; he is now required to think about overall corporate direction,
development of multiple product lines, employee morale, communications,
and long range planning. Potential merger or acquisition candidates present
themselves; and the company itself is courted by larger corporations. Tax and
legal considerations loom increasingly large. The entrepreneur may find
himself no longer the central figure of the company and he may wish to sell
his interest and retire or start over again. The company has ceased to be a
new enterprise and has become a growth business, maybe the IBM of the
future!
Despite, indeed perhaps because of, its speculative future prospects,
the company has undoubtedly become attractive to the public. If it had not
previously issued stock publicly, it can now turn to the public financial
markets with some degree of confidence. Long term loans are now also
available since the company has sufficient assets to serve as collateral. The
technological enterprise, through its ingenuity, efforts, persistence and good
luck, has stood the test of time and established itself as a going concern.
FINANCIAL SOURCES
A wide variety of financial sources are potentially available to fund the
technology-based company's capital requirements through the successive
stages of its growth and development. But embryonic technological
enterprises are quite different from most other new firms in their lack of
tangible resources. Many research- or technology-based companies start out
with little more resources than an oscilloscope and a soldering gun or a
magnifying glass. Many begin with only the entrepreneur's intelligence and
drive as inventory. With little else for collateral, the entrepreneur's
searches for funds from banks and other formal financial institutions are also
8often fruitless. Alternatively, the term "venture capital" often comes to mind
when thinking of the initial financing of new enterprises. And yet, it has long
been true (and still is!) that the bulk of financiers known as "venture
capitalists" do not support the earliest stage of capital acquisition for the
vast majority of technology-based enterprises. Venture capitalists generally
prefer later-stage investments in growing enterprises, not early-stage
investments in technological start-ups. (See Rubenstein, 1958, for historical
evidence.)
Despite all the attention paid to them, venture capital firms of all sorts
(including "wealthy family funds", conventional venture capital firms, seed
capital funds, SBICs, as well as financial and non-financial corporations
operating their own funds), still account for only a small fraction of initial
financing of new firms. At the extreme Dunkelberg & Cooper (1983, p. 370)
found less than half of one percent of their sampled companies funded by
venture capital firms. But this is due in part to the fact that their sample
"included few of the growth-oriented, high-technology companies which are
of particular interest to venture capital firms." Bygrave & Timmons (1985, p.
115) found that the 1978 decrease in capital gains tax was followed by a
sharp increase "in the proportion of ... first round [venture capital]
investments in highly innovative technological companies (p<.0001). The
proportions of seed-stage companies [also] showed an increasing trend
... (p<.002)." But recent data on the entire venture capital industry (Venture,
1989, p. 55) show that only 2 percent of their 1987 investments went into
so-called seed-stage firms and only 11 percent went into so-called
start-ups, a significant decline from the 22 percent startup funding in 1981.
Fully three-fourths of the venture capital industry's investments now go for
second-stage and later-stage financings or leveraged buyouts of established
companies.
But if not the venture capitalist, then to whom does the entrepreneur
turn for funds to finance his dreams? Although initial requirements may be
low, who is willing to gamble on the start-up's success? And once the future
begins to look promising, where can the entrepreneur find several hundred
thousand to a few million dollars of growth capital? The many classes of
potential financiers for new technical enterprises are examined here in an
effort to determine their resources, attitudes toward risk, selection criteria,
preferred investment terms, and post-investment relationships with the
9young technical firm. I will consider them in the order of their general
likelihood of being an initial investor in the new firm.
Personal Savings
Undoubtedly the most available source of capital to the entrepreneur is
his personal savings. Indeed, Dunkelberg & Cooper (1983) had found personal
savings, either alone or in combination with other sources, to be the primary
source of financing for 59 percent of the 890 owner-started firms they
studied in a wide variety of mostly non-technical industries. Tyebjee & Bruno
(1982) indicated similar dominance of personal savings in the funding of 185
California technology-oriented companies. However, those savings are
typically quite limited and the average individual scientist or engineer in his
early 30s would have difficulty in raising more than $25,000 to $50,000 on
the strength of his savings account, his signature, and his available
collateral. The entrepreneur must realize though that he may be required by
other investors to gamble much of his own assets on his company as a sign of
good faith. It is especially important that he and his co-founders own the
bulk of the company initially, as later dilution of their ownership will
necessarily follow from the required acceptance of increasing amounts of
outside capital. The entrepreneur should recognize that his potential capital
gain is phenomenal if the company proves successful and that he should be
risking much of his own "wealth" if the future looks bright.
Personal savings then are the foundation of initial capital. Usually
additional funds are not needed for close to a year or more, depending on the
scale of initial efforts. The entrepreneur can make many non-monetary forms
of investment in the company in the form of patents, developed products, and
free labor, previously referred to as "sweat equity". However, the assets of
the entrepreneur are all too soon exhausted and he must turn to outsiders for
capital. If the entrepreneur is personally wealthy, from birth or from
previous entrepreneurial success, the need for outsider investments may be
delayed significantly.
Family and Friends
Next to personal savings the assets of an entrepreneur's relatives and
friends are probably most available. The Dunkelberg & Cooper study (1983)
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cited earlier found that friends and relatives were the most important source
of capital for starting 13 percent of the businesses in their survey of
members of the National Federation of Independent Businesses. Such
investments often take the form of short term loans, although the loans may
later be changed into "equity" investments at the insistence of subsequent
investors. The main advantage of such funds is that they are relatively easy
to get. The investors know the entrepreneur and have assessed his
capabilities. Often the entrepreneur, unsure of whether his venture will
succeed, properly feels reluctant to "take advantage" of such close personal
relationships to raise money. The major disadvantage if friends and relatives
do invest is that they may feel that the investment gives them the right to
advise or actively interfere with management. Therefore, although such
"naive" money is relatively easy to obtain, many problems may result from its
acceptance.
Private Individual Investors, or "Angels"
The great majority of initial investing through outside investors has
traditionally been undertaken by wealthy individuals. Gordon Baty long ago
characterized the traditional private venture capitalist as having a tax
bracket favoring capital gains. Furthermore, being "accountable only to
himself for his actions, he can afford the inevitable loss and he often has
motivations for investing which are not strictly economic". (Baty, 1964)
Non-economic motivations include a sense of gambling, participation in an
exciting growth company, especially the involvement with young bright
people, and sometimes satisfying his sense of social responsibility, perhaps
related to his wealth. Unfortunately the current lack of tax differences
between regular income and capital gains may well affect this individual's
motives and actions.
The private individual seldom seeks out investments. Instead he learns
of opportunities from contacts within the financial community of which he is
often a member. Investment bankers, commercial bankers and brokers all
refer companies to him. Occasionally the prospective individual investor
participates in local groups like the MIT Enterprise Forum, where early-stage
entrepreneurs present their aspirations and problems.
William Wetzel (1983, 1986, 1987) and his followers (Neiswander,
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1985; Tynes & Krasner, 1983) have carefully analyzed this informal risk
capital investor, whom Wetzel calls a "business angel", and the market in
which they operate. The angel's resources are considerable, with venture
investment portfolios aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion
according to Wetzel (1987, p. 412) and a study funded by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) (IC2 Institute, 1989, p. 40). Acting alone or through a
syndicate of friends and acquaintances he can raise as much as $1,000,000
for a given deal, although he seldom does. The several studies cited above
find that a large fraction of the deals are for $50,000 to $300,000, typically
involving an angel and one or more of his friends, each putting up $25,000 to
$100,000. These investors usually do not seek a controlling interest or
management position in the company, but most prefer to be consulted on
major management decisions.
Such investors rely heavily on the advice of their friends and other
backers when making investment decisions. Few make a detailed analysis of
the situation, evaluating the company primarily on the basis of its
management. The investments are usually straight equity. The wealthy
individual venture capitalist thus tends to qualify as the type investor needed
in the company's initial phase. The entrepreneur need only find the right angel
for his company; this is not easy, despite the computerized "matching
network" created by Wetzel for informal investors in the New England area
and now also replicated elsewhere in the United States. Patterns of informal
investor behavior seem comparable in California and New England (Tynes &
Krasner, 1983) as well as in the midwest (Neiswander, 1985).
Wealthy Family Venture Capital Groups
More-or-less next in line, at least historically, in likelihood of
investing at the outset of a technological enterprise is the formal private
venture capital investment group established by a wealthy family. Shortly
after World War II several wealthy families created such organizations to
invest family resources in young businesses, especially those based on
advanced technologies, in search of capital gains. The largest of these
groups, led by such people as Laurance Rockefeller, Jock Whitney, and Payson
and Trask, became well-known within the investing community and
instrumental in funding numerous technological enterprises. Rather than
invest informally and as individuals (as the "angels" above) those families
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usually funded an autonomous investing organ (corporation or partnership),
managed by a staff of full-time employees who analyze incoming investment
proposals, make the investment decisions (usually without family
participation in the decision), and work with the investee companies during
the post-investment period. Venrock, founded by the Rockefeller family, is
perhaps the best known of the current survivors of these organizations.
As these family groups developed they evolved a certain style of
operations that became the basis for today's U.S. venture capital industry,
with resulting advantages and disadvantages to the entrepreneur who deals
with them. The advantages to an entrepreneur who gets funds from such
family groups are many. Other investors look more favorably at the new
company because these larger family groups have a reputation for choosing
only the best companies. This of course makes it easier to obtain additional
capital later. Their resources are essentially unlimited, making it possible
for the entrepreneur to come back later for more capital. The staffs of such
family groups have had top quality reputations, with both business and
technical expertise. The final advantage is that they are patient investors,
willing to wait five or ten years for their returns, and they do not have to
answer to stockholders or outside investors for their performance.
The disadvantages associated with investments by the organized family
groups are also numerous. They have been very discriminating in choosing
their investments, investing typically in less than 1% of the proposals they
receive; the entrepreneur must submit a detailed proposal (called a "business
plan") to be considered. The investors will demand one or more positions on
the board of directors of the company and detailed ongoing reports of
operations. They may insist on placing a staff member in an operating
position in the company if growth does not materialize, or even worse from
the entrepreneur's perspective, they may step in and replace the founding
entrepreneurial head of the company. They are also rather slow in reaching a
decision, so the entrepreneur must approach them several months before he
needs the money. At their beginnings the family venture capitalists often
avoided initial financing, but now tend to be willing to put in small sums as
early-stage investments, especially in companies headed by entrepreneurs
with whom they have had prior experience.
Venture Caoital Companies
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The family venture capital groups were the models for the formation of
specialized closed-end investment companies that focused on venture capital.
The first of these was American Research and Development Corporation
(ARD), organized in Boston in 1946 in large part through the efforts of the
then Chairman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Karl T.
Compton, and a number of prominent alumni and friends of MIT, to move
research and technological ideas forward into the market. This approach led
to formation of and ARD investments in such MIT spinoff companies as High
Voltage Engineering and onics. Gradually ARD's approach changed under the
guidance of Georges Doriot, a professor at the Harvard Business School who
served as president of ARD, and who moved ARD toward imitation of the
larger family groups in almost every respect. A full-time staff of
professionals annually screened hundreds of incoming proposals, giving
careful consideration to perhaps ten percent of them, and eventually investing
in two to three percent of the companies. In its early days ARD usually took
dominant stock ownership position in a company through an investment of
$100,000 to $500,000 in the form of convertible debentures, with $200,000
buying 80 percent of High Voltage in 1946 and $100,000 gaining 75 percent of
Ionics in 1948. Its principal success by far was the $70,000 start-up
investment in 1957 that purchased 78 percent of Digital Equipment
Corporation, that success dwarfing all other actions ever taken by ARD,
accounting for 86 percent of ARD's total value distributed to its stockholders.
(Stevenson, Muzyka & Timmons, 1986, p. 383)
Following the lead of pioneers like ARD other professionally-managed
venture capital funds were formed, usually raising their money privately from
wealthy individuals, banks, pension funds and corporations. Whereas ARD had
strong bias toward companies located in the greater Boston area, funds were
formed in other parts of the United States with tendencies toward regional
biases. Florida & Kenney (1988) trace the evolution of these regional venture
capital complexes and their current behaviors as investors, especially in
regard to high technology firms. Gradually these professional funds
proliferated and came to dominate the venture capital sector, becoming far
larger in magnitude of total funds managed and invested than the
earlier-formed wealthy family funds. Venture capital companies such as TA
Associates, Hambrecht and Quist, Kleiner Perkins and many others became
well-known for technology-oriented investments in particular. Recent
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analysis demonstrates "a core group of highly skilled and experienced venture
capital firms accounting for a disproportionate share of HITV [highly
innovative technological venture] investing. The 21 venture capital firms
that were most active in HITV investing represent less than 5 percent of the
464 firms in our database, yet they were involved in nearly 25 percent of all
the investments in HITVs." (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986, p. 168) And despite
the general aversion of most venture capital companies to early-stage
investments, Fast (1982) has shown that venture capital investments are a
leading indicator of the growth of new technological industries, perhaps
driven by the investment behavior of this "core group".
In general the professionally managed venture capital funds follow
patterns of investment analysis, decision-making and management similar to
those practiced first by the family funds and then by ARD. Careful screening
and selectivity characterize their investments, only 2% of the proposals
received getting a favorable response (Maier & Walker, 1987, p. 208). The
venture capital firms aspire toward high rates of potential return to
compensate their investors for the presumably high risks being taken, and
devote considerable post-investment effort to monitoring and actively
assisting their portfolio companies. Indeed, founders of many
high-technology companies "reported that they actively seek out those
venture capitalists with noteworthy reputations for their nonmonetary, high
value-added contributions to fledgling firms." (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986, p.
169)
Among the hundreds of venture capital funds is a small group of
so-called "seed funds", like the Zero Stage Capital Equity Funds which I
co-founded, that focus on investments primarily in the initial and early
stages of technology-based firms. These "seed" or "zero stage" funds follow
in the tradition of the earliest activities of the wealthy families and of ARD
in helping to put together the startup enterprises, working very closely with
the company founders to round out their team, more sharply define their
business objectives, help develop a completed business plan, providing
possibly more value in advice and "sleeves rolled up" assistance than in the
capital itself. Such funds typically invest from $200,000 to $500,000 at the
initial stage of a new company, with perhaps matching funds available for
participation in a later second round of financing. The seed funds seldom have
"deep pockets", and seek kindred spirits for sharing the initial investment so
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as to ease the difficulties that might be experienced later in securing the
hopefully much larger requirements of growth financing. One unique seed fund
that has helped many Massachusetts startups is the Massachusetts
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), state chartered and funded
during a period of low public availability of venture capital. It works very
closely and effectively with other Boston-area seed funds to help initiate and
enhance early growth of local technical firms.
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs)
A special form of venture capital company that was especially
important in the U.S. during the early 1960s was the SBIC, enacted by
Congress in the 1958 Small Business Investment Act. Private capital was
given tax incentives and low interest leveraged loans from the U.S.
government to invest in small business. Several hundred SBICs were
chartered with combined assets of nearly $1 billion, but only 50 of them had
assets greater than $1 million. The resulting generally small financial
organizations invested heavily in real estate and the trade sector, with some
of the larger ones investing in new technical companies. In this early period
15 to 20 percent of the SBIC investments were made in early-stage
companies that were less than one year old. But probably less than ten
percent of the SBIC capital was invested in technologically-oriented
companies. Overall, however, the SBICs did have significant impact by the
principal fact of their funds availability during a period of time that was
otherwise relatively dry of small business investing resources.
A recent analysis of SBIC activity shows that "the number of SBIC
financings to firms 1 year or younger exceeded the combined financings of 3
year old and 2 year old firms" (Feigen & Arrington, 1986), indicating that they
still provide a critical role to young companies. However, the 91 independent
SBICs control less than half of one percent of the capital in the venture
capital industry, restricting the magnitude of their overall impact. (Venture
Capital Journal, 1989, p. 11) Data are not available on how many of them
focus on technologically-oriented investments although personal experience
supports that some large SBICs, such as Bank of Boston Ventures, are active
and important participants in investments in early stage technology-based
firms.
"I
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Non-Financial Corporations
Beginning in the early 1960s and increasing significantly only in the
1980s, major manufacturing firms have become interested in supplying
venture capital to young technological companies. Many of them are seeking
to supplement their in-house research and development efforts by backing
entrepreneurs in hopes of gaining access both to technology and engineering
talent. Initially companies such as DuPont, Ford, Texas Instruments and Union
Carbide experimented with this approach of direct venture capital investment
in new or early stage companies. Later Exxon, Inco, Lubrizol and Monsanto
demonstrated active and effective programs of investment that encouraged
widespread participation by many Fortune 500 corporations. Today 84 U.S.
industrial corporations are managing approximately two billion dollars in
dedicated venture capital pools, in addition to many more corporations that
invest in pooled funds managed by professional venture capitalists, in
addition to still more corporations that occasionally make a strategic
investment in a new company but do not have ongoing venture investment
activities. (Venture Capital Journal, 1989, p. 11)
Non-financial corporations differ significantly from the previously
discussed venture capitalists in regard to their motivations, selection
criteria and attitudes toward the technological enterprise. Their prime
consideration is usually technology. Most investing firms choose only a few
technical fields in which to invest, sometimes related or complementary to
their current lines of business, at other times wholly unrelated, depending
upon the corporation's present strategy of concentration or diversification.
The quality of the entrepreneurial team is usually the second most important
decision criterion. They have tended to avoid providing initial capital, often
because they do not see the opportunities soon enough or because they cannot
act fast enough, instead preferring somewhat later growth financing. In
recent years this tendency has changed somewhat, especially in areas of
medical technology and advanced materials, where a number of non-financial
corporations have developed close ties to venture capitalists that allow the
corporations to see and participate in early stage financings.
The non-financial firms often are willing to provide technical,
marketing and managerial assistance to the companies in which they invest,
potentially more valuable than the funds themselves if these services can be
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accessed and utilized effectively by the investee. This assistance, which in
earlier writings I have labelled "venture nurturing" (Roberts, 1980), plus very
"deep pockets", may be the primary advantages provided by the corporate
venture capitalist, but combine with some potential disadvantages. The
corporation may have a tendency to interfere more in the day-to-day
operations of the young firm than the entrepreneurs find desireable.
Furthermore, the corporate investor may oppose the firm "going public",
preferring to merge it eventually into its own operations. Entrepreneurs
often think that going public is the ultimate measure of and route to personal
glory and financial success, but the facts are that far more technical
companies eventually sell out to larger companies than go public. Thus the
entrepreneur frequently is leery of corporate funding at early stages of the
firm but becomes less naive and resistant to their funds and help as his
company moves forward.
Commercial Banks
In some areas of the U.S. commercial banks have taken an active role in
supplying capital to new technical enterprises, even though the bank itself is
restricted by regulations in how it can invest its resources. During the early
years of a company the more venturesome banks supply short term loans
secured by projected accounts receivables based on contracts or orders
received by the firm. These sometimes can get converted effectively into
intermediate or even long term loans through constant renewals and
renegotiation. Bruno (1986, p. 113) cites Ashton-Tate, the large software
company, as having refused venture capital funds offered to it, securing
instead a $6 million line of credit from Bankers Trust. Banks can also help
through long-term lease financing of laboratory or manufacturing equipment.
Bank-owned SBICs, discussed above, can of course become direct investors
and the SBICs and/or bank commercial lending officers can assist in
establishing relationships with conventional venture capital funds.
Bank-affiliated venture capital funds account for almost $2 billion,
approximately 6 percent of the venture capital industry's total resources.
(Venture Capital Journal, 1989, p. 1 )
The bank's motives for its lending, investing and referral activities are
primarily future profits to be generated through regular banking business
with a growing corporation. By helping to finance the firm when it is young
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the bank hopes to retain the company's conventional banking business when
the company becomes large and successful. Thus the bank's attitudes and
patience may well differ from other potential investors. Banks are strongly
influenced by the Small Business Administration's loan guaranty program,
which substantially lessens a bank's risks of lending to a small company. In
the last decade SBA guaranty approvals have declined from about 24,000 per
year to nearly 15,000, (Venture, 1989, p.55) but we have no information
available on the extent to which these affect the initial funding of
technological firms.
Public Stock Issues
During several short periods of time since the early 1960s the start-up
entrepreneur could turn even initially to the public market in the United
States for very early-stage capital, especially for a high-tech or otherwise
"glamorous" company. Although few people active today in venture financing
will remember, 1969 was the peak year to date (!!) for initial public offerings
by early-stage companies. More recent peaks occurred in 1983 and then again
in 1986. But those speculative times are usually short-lived. In contrast
when a more conservative mood prevails, especially in "bear market"
conditions, it becomes very difficult, certainly very costly, for even the
successful growing new enterprise to raise public funds.
A young technical company may have many reasons to go public. The
entrepreneur and the venture capital backers may wish to realize capital
gains; the entrepreneur may want a public market to insure that his holdings
will be liquid if he should die; the new enterprise may want the prestige of
being listed on the financial pages of the newspaper. Or, specifically relevant
to our current discussion of the financial base of the company, the company
may find that the public market will supply the least expensive or otherwise
most attractive funds for its further growth and development.
Regardless of the motivations the entrepreneur needs expert advice
from the financial community before attempting a public stock issue. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has extensive and complex
requirements that affect the process of "going public", as do many state
regulatory bodies. There are several different ways for a U.S. firm to raise
public money, including both underwritten and non-underwritten methods, and
_ ..-- - - - -
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in recent years including the possibility of going public in Britain.
Underwriters vary greatly in criteria and effectiveness, and need to be
carefully evaluated by the entrepreneur. Large investment banking houses, for
example, seldom underwrite issues of less than $10,000,000 and then usually
only when the firm meets other performance criteria. Thus early-stage
entrepreneurs need to deal with the smaller underwriters, with whom greater
caution is recommended. Consequently the public markets typically serve the
technical firm's growth capital financial needs, and not earlier requirements.
Synopsis
Figure 1 portrays the relationship of the stage of evolution of the
technology-based firm to the likely availability of capital from the various
investment sources discussed above. As such it constitutes a loose set of
testable hypotheses with respect to the sources of initial capital for the
technological firm. The diagram is inexact and is meant to convey the
primary tendencies of each class of investor during the three stages of a
company's development. As should be expected the investment behavior of
each group contains considerable variance, to be evidenced by the
presentation of empirical findings that follows.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This synopsis of initial capital sources for new technology-based firms
has not included any mention of pension funds or insurance companies, both
major participants in the overall U.S. capital markets. In fact, until recently
neither type of institution directly participated in initial or even early round
financing of high-tech firms. But both sources are major investors in the
pooled funds managed by venture capital firms, and a growing number of
pension funds and insurance companies have initiated programs of direct
venture investing. Corporate pension funds have been major players since
1981 and public employee retirement funds have become active since then. In
recent years over 20 states have also become involved in venture capital fund
investments, often with the combined motives of economic stimulus of their
own regions as well as increased returns on their investment portfolios.
(Maier & Walker, 1987, p. 210) Of course, both pension funds and insurance
companies often invest in the later growth financing of technical companies.
_ _m__Y______ljlXli·---.. ----i--
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SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The data analyzed here in order to test the rough hypotheses presented
above are part of a twenty years research program on all aspects of the
formation and growth of high-technology new enterprises. Elements of the
data collected in nine related studies (shown in Table 1) are used in part in
this article, covering information from one hundred fifty-six firms founded
by former employees of major laboratories and engineering departments of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Contrasting information is
used throughout from our unpublished studies of new firms founded by the
former employees of two large technological corporations, selected from
firms within the Greater Boston area that were most comparable in size and
nature of work to the MIT "source" labs. All data referred to in this article
relate to the financing of these companies at age zero of their lives. Work is
now underway to examine patterns of evolution of the later funding and
performance of these firms.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Beginning with strong cooperation of senior managers in each of the
nine MIT source organizations studied, initial lists were developed of people
who were thought to have spun-off new enterprises from that organization.
Follow-up interviews were used to generate further suggestions in a
"snowball" sample creation process as well as to screen the initial lists for
errors. Rigorous criteria were applied to include only those who had been
former full-time employees of the source organizations, who later
participated as founders of wholly-new for-profit companies. (As very few
female entrepreneurs were found in these samples of technical entrepreneurs,
the male pronoun will be used in the remainder of this article in referring to
the entrepreneurs.)
Structured interviews with a detailed questionnaire, lasting typically
one to two and one-half hours, were used to gather data from each
entrepreneur personally, with telephone interviews used in less than ten
percent of the cases and mailed interviews used only as a last resort in less
than one percent of the cases. (A copy of the questionnaire is available upon
request from the author.) Some interviews stretched to seven or eight hours
over two or three sessions. Despite extensive efforts to include all spin-offs
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from each source organization studied, no doubt some minor bias has crept
into the sample of companies studied in that it is likely that any companies
not located were less successful than those traced. The bias did not prevent
many companies from being found and studied that were clearly failures or
not very successful.
The limitation of the primary source organizations of the spinoffs to
the major laboratories and major academic departments at one technological
university is a key restriction on any claims of generality from these data.
However, the comparisons with firms formed by ex-employees of two major
corporations may help, although they too are limited to a single geographic
area, Greater Boston, and are dominated by electronics technology.
Answers to the detailed questionnaires led easily to the quantification
of information. Most all of the answers were coded and arranged in computer
data files. Incomplete information on some of the companies does not
particularly affect the data analysis as relevant codes were given to isolate
missing information.
THE INITIAL CAPITAL BASE
Amount and Source
Many entrepreneurs begin their companies with a minimal amount of
initial capital and often find their operations hampered by a shortage of
capital. Other entrepreneurs, perhaps wiser or just monetarily more
fortunate, raise substantial funds before beginning their ventures and have
their operations proceed relatively free of financial constraints.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of initial capital of 113 new
technology-based companies spun-off from MIT departments and laboratories.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Twenty-three percent of these companies (26) were begun with funds of less
than one thousand dollars. Almost half began with less than $10,000. Only
twenty-two percent (25) began with funds equal to or in excess of fifty
thousand dollars, of which the vast majority (20 out of 25) began operations
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on a full-time basis.
Comparisons with these data arise from our several separate samples
of new companies, including 38 spin-off firms from a large electronic
systems company which had initial funding similar to the MIT spinoffs: 18
percent with less than one thousand dollars; 42 percent with less than
$10,000; only 18 percent with more than fifty thousand dollars. And twenty
three spin-offs from a large technologically diversified corporation had
somewhat higher but still small average startup equity of $67,000. Rather
remarkably, clusters of companies incorporated ten years apart experienced
the same distribution of initial capital, with a median of $15,000. A very
different type of company, the consumer-oriented manufacturing firms we
studied in a separate sample, also had modest beginnings, over half of them
starting with less than $10,000.
The precise amounts of initial capital for 154 technology-based
companies in our samples ranged from zero dollars for several firms to one
company's $900,000. Close to half of these firms started on a part-time
basis. Of 52 firms begun on a part-time basis that provided financing data,
58 percent started with less than $10,000 while only 38 percent of the
full-time operations began with so little.
As reported in Table 2 personal funds of the founders were the primary
sources used to finance the start of over seventy percent of these companies,
and family and friends were key contributors to the start of an additional five
percent. These percentages were consistent across all subgroups of MIT
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
spin-off companies, as well as those from a large electronic systems
company and from a sample of high-technology entrepreneurial firms whose
early years were carefully assessed. Similar personal or "close" sources
funded 20 out of 23 companies spun-off from a large diversified corporation,
as well as 80 percent of the consumer-oriented manufacturers. The other
companies were begun through funds obtained primarily from private
investors or "angels", venture capital firms or non-financial corporations at
which the founders worked, with a few funded by the public stock market. We
found these same two sources, the founders themselves and private investors,
I^---------I_
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to be the dominant initial financiers of a sample of 21 companies which were
carefully evaluated for later funding by one venture capital firm we studied.
Those starting on a part-time basis were even more likely to use their
own personal funds to finance the early years of the company. (Query, not
answerable from the data: Does this reflect less need for funds by part-time
founders, not yet fully committed to their firms? Their "burn rate" might
certainly be smaller than the full-time companies. Or does it reflect "savvy
entrepreneurs", moving ahead appropriately slowly on their own funds, holding
on to equity ownership until further progress is achieved? Or is the direction
of causality here really the other way? Did lack of outside capital support
force the entrepreneur to utilize his own limited personal resources and thus
restrict him to starting on a part-time basis only?)
As anticipated in the discussion above no equity capital was supplied by
commercial banks, but bank credit came early and frequently into these
companies. Many of the companies had early sales by contract to government
or large industrial organizations, and the banks often granted loans to these
firms, attaching the contract payments as security.
In Table 3 the amounts of initial capital and their sources are shown in
detail for 110 new enterprises. The specific amounts of money provided by
the various categories of investors are obviously incidental to the specific
time periods at which these companies were incorporated and to some extent
to the specific industries in which they were involved. New biotechnology
companies, not included in this sample, would for example typically generate
far more initial capital than new software firms, of which several were in
this sample. But what is more important and persistent over time and
industry in my experience are the relative distributions of which sources are
actively involved at the outset of new technical firms, and which ones
provide more rather than less amounts of capital.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The figures in Table 3 demonstrate empirically what might have been
assumed beforehand: In the relatively few cases where money was obtained
through "outside" forms of financing (those sources other than the founders or
their families or friends), those sources provided far greater average
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amounts (p<.001). Of twenty-six firms begun with funds from outside
sources, twenty had initial capital equal to or in excess of $50,000. Of
eighty-five companies funded by personal or "close" money, only five were
begun with comparable amounts. Similar patterns were found in each of our
research clusters. For example, among the enterprises being assessed by a
venture capitalist for "step-up" funding, those which initially had been
self-financed had started with considerably less capital (an average of
$90,000) than the companies funded by private investors (an average initially
of $215,000) (p=0.02).
The primary reason for this difference is understandable. The amount of
money that the founders and their associates have is limited by the fact that
these are personal funds. Indeed some of the founders did have a healthy
personal stake from the sale of previous ventures, e.g., 5 of 21 self-funded
spin-offs from the MIT Instrumentation Lab, to cite an extreme case. But
most entrepreneurs had access only to accumulated savings from past
earnings, not capital from sales of prior companies. The "outside" financial
sources by their nature have a much greater supply of money available for
investment in a technological entrepreneurial startup.
The more basic question of why some entrepreneurs sought out and
received funds from outside sources and why other entrepreneurs either did
not seek or did not receive initial outside capital cannot be answered simply.
Some more insight will be provided in analyses of venture capitalist
decision-making that will be carried out in later research using our database.
But three possible answers to this question are apparent and all somewhat
applicable: (1) The need did not exist. (2) The desire for outside funds did not
exist. (3) The entrepreneurs were unable to obtain outside funds.
Analyses below will demonstrate that the need for initial funds varies
significantly among new enterprises as a function of their industry and type
of business, and indeed size of founding group, among other influences.
Clearly, many firms did not need outside financing. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, the general interviews and our several specific studies of venture
financing did reveal many failed attempts at raising capital by entrepreneurs
who ended up using only personal or family and friends funding. Some
entrepreneurs did not know how to go about seeking outside funding and used
their own monies as a default.
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However, other entrepreneurs knew of the more formal sources, might
well in our judgment have been successful in gaining outside commitments,
but chose not to. Some entrepreneurs want little or no equity financing at the
outset because they wish to retain a maximum amount of ownership and
control. They often seek primarily debt from outside sources, resulting
usually in relatively small loans because of the founders' limited net worth.
Then, in order to cope with the constraints of their limited funds, the
entrepreneurs gear their operations to reduce their need for funds, e.g., they
render a service instead of producing hardware or they tend to engage in
custom-oriented development and production that can be contracted with
larger firms or government agencies. The contracts provide advances and/or
progress payments that minimize additional financial requirements. One
small study provided statistical support for this explanation, demonstrating
that the entrepreneurs who initially preferred debt to equity tended to
finance the companies themselves (0.015) and had lower initial capitalization
(0.11).
But several of the self-financing entrepreneurs seemed rather less
rational and more emotional in their emphatic opposition to sharing the
profits of their labors and their ideas with others "who did nothing more than
provide money"! Not understanding that initial capital for a high-technology
company is a very risky investment, such entrepreneurs repeatedly cite
venture capitalists as "vultures" who want something for nothing. Underlying
this rather naive and often angry opposition, and also involved with many
other aspects of financing, are a complexity of motivations that I cannot even
attempt to explain. In a small study of 20 entrepreneurs who were seeking
capital, we compared those who had initially supplied more than 50 percent
of their equity from personal funds with those who had obtained that much
from outside investors. The self-funded entrepreneurs were found to have
significantly higher evaluations of the importance of independence of action
(p=.025). In addition five of the seven entrepreneurs in this cluster who
indicated that independence of action was the most important reason for
starting a company initially engaged primarily in self-financing.
The data analyses reveal that those individuals with the greatest
amount of commercial work experience started their companies with more
initial phase capital financing (.08). These individuals, by virtue of their
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more extensive familiarity with the industrial and financial community, were
probably more aware of venture capital sources and how to approach them
successfully. Their greater experience no doubt also provided some modicum
of comfort to the investors. Not necessarily in conflict with this finding is
that a significant fraction of entrepreneurs coming out of MIT labs and
departments felt their previous association with MIT had aided their capital
seeking efforts.
Initial Capital and the Number of Founders
The number of founders can influence the amount bf initial capital both
directly and indirectly. As the number of founders increases more personal
funds are available from which to draw money. This has a direct effect in
that over seventy percent of the companies we studied were financed initially
by personal funds. Indirectly, the more founders there are, the greater
possibility that one of them knows a receptive "outside" source. Furthermore,
multiple founders are likely to reflect a more substantial intended
undertaking, e.g. product development and manufacture rather than just
research or consulting. This implied need for greater funds both generates
and justifies its supply. And the larger team is itself likely to be more
impressive to outside sources, partly explaining our research finding that
outside sources are more willing to invest in multi-founder companies.
Table 4 presents the initial capital amounts associated with the number
of founders of 109 companies. The largest proportion of companies which
began with less than $10,000 (62.5%) was in the group of one-founder
companies. In general the larger the number of founders, the less the
occurrence of financing under $10,000 and the greater the occurrence of
funding in excess of $50,000.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
We carried out separate analyses of the companies begun primarily with
the entrepreneurs' own funds and those started with others' funds. Nearly
half of the firms founded by a single individual using his own money began
with less than $1000. In the founder-funded firms greater amounts of initial
capital were provided as the number of founders increased. (Tau=0.19, p=.03)
Looking across the entire sample of companies, at each size of founding group
27
the average amount of funds supplied by others was greater than the average
supplied by the founders themselves. All but six of twenty-six companies
which obtained funds primarily from others were started by multi-founder
teams. And for outsider-funded firms, the same finding holds that the number
of founders and the amount of initial capital received are positively related.
(Tau=0.23, p=.08)
These results are wholly supported by other studies of venture capital
decision processes. Tyebjee & Bruno found (1984, p. 1060) that "lack of
managerial capabilities significantly increases the perceived risk (p<0.05) [of
investing]", those capabilities reflecting multi-functional skills only
achievable with a multi-founder team. Their earlier work (Bruno & Tyebjee,
1983, p. 290) had also shown that deficiencies in the venture's management
team explained funding rejections in a third of the cases. Goslin & Barge
(1986, p. 366) agreed that "the significant factor leading to [venture
capitalist] funding is the management team". And MacMillan, Siegel & Subba
Narasimha (1985, p. 125) concluded that "just under one-half [42%] of venture
capitalists will not even consider a venture that does not have a balanced
team."
Initial Capital and Specific Plans
Not all the entrepreneurs had specific plans for their companies when
they decided to start them. Twenty-four of fifty-three entrepreneurs (45%)
who responded to questioning indicated that they had neither specific short
term nor long term plans at the beginning of their companies. With no
specific plan considerable investment is not necessary. The Alice in
Wonderland adage applies here: If you don't care where you are going, any path
will get you there. Nor is an investment likely to be attracted from an
outside professionally managed financial source when the nature of the future
work is so uncertain.
In Table 5 the amounts of initial capital for twenty-nine firms started
with specific plans are compared with the amounts for twenty-three firms
started without specific plans. Seventy-four percent of those without
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
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specific plans started with less than $10,000 whereas only 24 percent of the
companies with specific plans were formed with so little funding.
Furthermore, 38 percent of the companies begun by founders with specific
plans received funding in excess of $50,000 while only 9 percent of the
companies lacking specific plans had so much initial capital. Clearly
entrepreneurs with specific plans raised more initial capital than those
without plans. (.001)
As might be expected from the discussion thusfar the more institutional
sources of financing are much more inclined to support ventures which have a
specifically planned future. Table 6 shows that ten of twelve companies
which received other than personal or "close" funding had specific operational
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
plans at the start. Clearly most investors see firms with plans as better
bets. In addition the entrepreneurs who prepared detailed plans no doubt
foresaw needs for greater capital and went out to get it. But of course not all
prospective entrepreneurs who plan get funded. MacMillan & Subba Narasimha
(1986, p. 409) found that "excessively optimistic forecasts of performance
can create a fatal credibility problem", which might explain in part why only
17 of the 27 planners in our sample of firms received outside funding.
The two companies in this cluster that received outside funds despite
lack of specific plans are special exceptions. One was founded by several MIT
employees who had been left without work when MIT abandoned its atomic
energy research. These founders along with nearly ninety other MIT
employees engaged in the same work formed a company without specific
goals, but backed strongly by private investors, an investment that is easily
understood. The other situation involved a new company formed from the
division of a larger corporation, spun-off in its entirety due to rising costs.
The venture was backed by a public stock issue generated by the parent
company. Excluding these two unique cases only companies with specific
plans obtained money from the more sophisticated sources of financing.
Specific backgrounds of the entrepreneurs, age, education, work
experience did not relate statistically to the amount or source of initial
capital. Other researchers (MacMillan, Siegel & Subba Narasimha, 1985, p.
_jC_ 
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122) have found that entrepreneur personality characteristics are strong
influences upon venture capitalist investment decisions, but we did not have
adequate data in our sample to validate these findings. Of those firms formed
from the large electronic systems corporation, founders with prior patents
raised larger amounts of initial capital (.02), but this relationship was not
supported in any of our other samples.
Initial Capital and Product Initially
Information gathered from 110 firms indicated that forty-seven (43 %)
of them were based on specific products that had already been developed or
which the entrepreneurs planned to develop immediately. A firm dependent
upon a product needs capital, whether for product development or production
facilities or market launch. Such a firm would have difficulties getting
operations underway without substantial capital. Since the sixty-three other
firms in this grouping did not have a product or immediate product objectives,
they needed considerably less initial capital to get going.
Table 7 displays the amount of initial capital for forty-three companies
that had a product or specific product plans initially and for fifty-nine
companies that did not. The group with initial products were initially
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
financed to a greater extent. (.02) This situation is driven statistically by
the fact that twenty-one of these firms without product began with less than
$1000, while only three companies with products had similarly small initial
funding.
A product-oriented company's capital requirements do vary according to
the nature of the product, its stage of development, development
requirements, its production process, as well as the demand for the product.
Among 21 firms in one of our samples those with a "proprietary" product (the
combination perhaps of "specific plans" and a product orientation) had
significantly higher initial capitalization ($200,000 on average) than those
without a proprietary product ($129,000) (.07). But it is doubtful that capital
required would ever be much less than $1000. Indeed each of the three
product-oriented firms listed in Table 7 that had begun with less than $1000
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was in the process of developing its first product, making its meager funding
slightly more understandable.
The distribution of initial capital within the group of spin-offs that
began without a product is readily explainable. Many of these companies were
initially engaged in activities such as technical consulting or computer
programming. Little or no financing was needed to start them. Others were
involved with work such as systems design and development, which required
capital primarily to support technical personnel and equipment. Here capital
needs varied, depending on the size of work to be done. There is a bit of the
chicken-versus-egg issue here. In some of these cases companies that had
problems in raising initial outside capital had already abandoned their earlier
intentions and started to do things that were not capital-intensive. Thus lack
of available initial capital often influenced the apparent lack of "initial"
product orientation!
No significant differences were observable in the sources of capital for
both groups. Thirty companies (70 percent) formed around a product were
financed by founders or close associates, while thirteen generated other
funds. Fifty-one companies (82 percent, slightly more than the above group)
without an initial product focus were funded by founders or family or friends,
while eleven received funds elsewhere. Tyebjee & Bruno (1984, p. 1057)
demonstrate a strong bias by venture capitalists (over 90 percent of their
deals) in favor of product manufacturing companies, but the venture
capitalists' reluctance to get involved at ground zero no doubt prevented their
product preference from being reflected in our data.
Amount by Needs and Type of Business
Table 8 presents responses from 107 entrepreneurs who ranked their
needs for capital. They contain wide variances that reflect the types of
business entered. In hardware production capital is first needed for product
development, then for production facilities and working capital. Software
companies need working capital for their technical personnel payroll and to
finance their accounts receivable (A/R), but they also need funds for
computer equipment and for product development work. Firms performing
contract research and development (R&D) exhibit needs for lab equipment,
product development, working capital and production facilities. Even
S . -- -- -- -
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individual consultants need funds for lab equipment and to fund development
work.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
None of the groups found that either marketing expenses or production
and clerical workers placed a stress on their capital needs. The technological
enterprise unfortunately displays typically little emphasis on marketing.
Also the Boston area labor market, relevant to most of the firms studied, has
been especially efficient until recently in terms of a new company's ability to
find both skilled and semiskilled hourly workers.
Given the differences in specific needs how do the capital requirements
vary in amount by type of business? The consultants and the software houses
required the least capital; nearly 80 percent of them were capitalized
initially at less than $10,000. Indeed, one software entrepreneur started his
company on $700 he received from selling his automobile. At the opposite
extreme were the hardware production firms, but even here 84 percent were
capitalized at under $50,000. This relatively modest figure is explained in
part by the fact that sixty percent of those companies were started on a
part-time basis. Most of the companies found that their initial funds were
insufficient to support their growth during their early years. Sixty percent of
the companies sought capital a second time and nearly half sought funds a
third time, but this will be discussed in more detail in later writings.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
This article has presented an assessment of the capital market for
technology-based firms, focusing upon the links between the stages of
evolution of a firm and the investment preferences of various capital sources.
The review of these factors led to an expectation that initial capital will be
supplied most frequently by the entrepreneurs themselves from their own
savings, secondarily by their families and friends and by private investors,
all these being sources of capital outside of the formal channels. More
substantial but still initial funding from "wealthy family funds", special
"seed" funds and somewhat more conventional venture capital funds were
expected to be the primary complements of the informal sources.
____·1_1_____^_1__· _ _ ^__·__(__i___r____)__·_*Zla__C__ rrlll__ *71___·___
32
The data from our studies of technological firms support these
expectations, while also providing evidence of the usual small initial capital
base (almost half with less than $10,000) and the dominance of personal
savings as the principal source of initial capital (74 percent of the
companies). Prospective entrepreneurs need to realize that most of their
predecessors got started on a shoestring. Prior studies do, however, indicate
that larger initial funding correlates with greater entrepreneurial success.
"Outside" sources of capital are responsible for the larger initial
investments when they occur. As listed in the Table 9 summary larger
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
amounts of initial capital are both contributed and raised by the larger groups
of co-founders, especially when the founders are involved in the companies
from the outset on a full-time basis. But the outside sources vary greatly,
and informal investors or "angels" are far more likely to provide initial funds
than are venture capital companies. Prospective entrepreneurs should seek
out these informal investors, perhaps taking advantage of contact
mechanisms such as Wetzel's New England Venture Capital Network (Wetzel,
1987) or Tulsa's Venture Capital Exchange (IC2 Institute, 1989, p. 42)
Specific plans for the company are associated with greater initial
capitalization, as well as with raising outside capital, as is also true for the
effect of having an initial product. The needs for initial capital vary
enormously by amount and intended use as a function of the type of business
being started, with consulting firms and software companies requiring far
less than hardware developers and producers. Prospective entrepreneurs need
to be forthcoming, in writing, on their aspirations, their rationale for
potential attractiveness of the contemplated companies, and their strategies
for achieving corporate growth and success.
The empirical data analyzed in this article come largely from companies
founded by former employees of MIT laboratories and academic departments.
Therefore, they may well be unrepresentative of other technology-based new
firms. However, at least within the Greater Boston area, the several other
samples of spinoffs in our data set, new firms incubated by large industrial
corporations or government laboratories, seem to confirm the findings from
 ____1_1__1__1_1_11_____
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the MIT-derived companies. Studies carried out by others in other parts of
the United States, overlapping some aspects of our analyses, add some degree
of confidence to the generalizability of the findings. But further research is
clearly needed on the patterns and causes of initial capitalization of new
technology-based enterprises founded in other regions and other countries.
Despite increasing numbers of studies of the decision processes of
venture capitalists (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; Goslin & Barge, 1986; MacMillan,
Siegel & Subba Narasimha, 1985; MacMillan & Subba Narasimha, 1986; Ruhnka
& Young, 1987; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), additional comparable research is
needed on the decision criteria of informal investors who are so critical in
initial funding especially. And more understanding is needed of the linkages
between entrepreneurial motivations and concerns and the process of
decision-making that results in self-funding of a new enterprise. Our
research studies only begin to touch upon this primary source of initial
enterprise capital. Finally, all these factors relating to initial capital --
amount, source, influences such as number of founders, specific business
plans, and type of business -- must be related to the later performance of the
company. Several studies already illuminate some aspects of these
relationships, but further research would be helpful to academics as well as
prospective entrepreneurs.
_______ 'Bm*-EOl-
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Figure 1. Primary Investment Preferences of Capital Sources
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Figure 2. Amount of Initial Capital (113 MIT Spin-off Companies,
Separated into Full-Time and Part-Time Founders)
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Table 1. Data Sources for Financing Study of New Technological Enterprises*
Sources of New Enterprises
New Companies Participants in
Identified Research Study
MIT major laboratories (4 studies)
MIT academic departments (5 studies)
Totals
107
74
181
96
60
156
* Among my former research assistants who contributed importantly to this
phase of research were E.K. Bender, H.A. Cohen, D.A. Forseth, D.R. Hall, J.C. Ruth
and P.V. Teplitz, as well as my former research associate Herbert A. Wainer.
--------· --- · """"""r""~""""""""nxc
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Table 2. Primary Source of Initial Capital (154 companies)
Source Number of Companies %
Personal Savings 114 74
Family and Friends 8 5
Private Individual Investors 11 7
Venture Capital Companies 8 5
Non-Financial Corporations 9 6
Commercial Banks 0 0
Public Stock Issues 4 3
154 100Totals
41
Table 3. Amount of Initial Capital by Source (110 companies)
Amount of Initial Capital ($ thousands)
Source <1 1-<10 10-<50 50-<100 100-<250 250-<500 >500 Total
Personal Savings 22 27 27 1 3 0 0 80
Family and Friends 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 5
Private Investors 0 0 2 2 3 1 0 8
Venture Capital Cos. 0 0 0 2 2 3 1 8
Non-Financial Corps. 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 8
Commercial Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Stock Issues 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
------------  · I"nmrBarnrmraua--
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Table 4. Amount of Initial Capital by Number of Founders (109 companies)
Number of
Founders
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Amount of Initial Capital ($ thousands)
<1 1-<10 1 0-<50 50-<100 100-<250 250-<500 >500
17 8 11
2 10 9
3 5 10
1 4
1
2 -
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
Kendall Tau= 0.25,
2
1
1
p= 0.01
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Table 5. Specific Plans for the Company and Amount of Initial Capital
( 52 companies )
Initial Capital
( $ thousands)
1
10
50
100
250
<1
-< 10
-< 50
-< 100
-< 250
-< 500
> 500
Totals
Specific Plans
Yes No
4
3
11
2
3
3
29
7
10
4
0
2
0
23
* Mann-Whitney U, p=0.001
___1_1·1__^___1·___X__nF___II____ -_^;^ r-------
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Table 6. Specific Plans for the Company and Source of Initial Capital
(49 companies)
Specific Plans
Source Yes No
Personal Savings 15 19
Family and Friends 2 1
Private Investors 3 1
Venture Capital Funds 3 0
Non-Financial Corporations 3 0
Commercial Banks 0 0
Public Stock Issues 1 1
Totals 27 22
_111_
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Table 7. Product Initially and Amount of Initial Capital (102 companies)
Initial Capital
( $ thousands)
Product Initially
Yes No
<1
1 -< 10
10 -< 50
50
100
250
-< 100
-< 250
-< 500
> 500
Totals
3
12
15
2
5
4
2
43
21
13
15
5
3
0
2
59
* Mann-Whitney U, p=0.02
 -'~"~~""""""""" 
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Table 8. Ranked Needs for Initial Capital (107 companies)
Hardware
33
Software
10
Contract R&D
22
Consulting
20
Product dev.
Lab equip.
Tech. personnel
A/R
Prod. facilities
Product dev.
Prod. facilities
Inventory
Other
A/R
Other
Tech. personnel
Lab equip.
AIR
Development
Lab equip.
Product dev.
A/R
-Prod. facilities
Tech. personnel
Tech. personnel
Lab equip.
A/R
Development
Inventory
Type of
Business
#
Aggregate
107
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
~~~~~~~ 1 _ _ 1 ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I     ~  ~~ ~~~ ~~~--
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Table 9. Initial Capital for the Technological Enterprise
Primary Sources of Capital:
Personal savings
Family and friends
Private individual investors
Larger Initial Capital Associated with:
Full-time, rather than part-time, commitment
Larger co-founding team
"Outside" initial investors
Specific plans for business development
Initial product available or targeted
Hardware focus, rather than software or consulting
_11_1 1  
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